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Abstract
This article analyzes the interplay between transparency and accountability in multilateral climate politics. The 2015 Paris Agreement
calls for a “pledge-and-review” approach to collective climate action with an “enhanced transparency framework” as a key pillar of
the Agreement. By making visible who is doing what, transparency is widely assumed to be vital to holding countries to account and
building trust. We explore whether transparency is generating such effects in this context, by developing and applying an analytical
framework to examine the link between transparency and accountability. We ﬁnd that the scope and practices of climate
transparency reﬂect (rather than necessarily reduce) broader conﬂicts over who should be held to account to whom and about what,
with regard to responsibility and burden sharing for ambitious climate action. We conclude that the relationship between
transparency and accountability is less straightforward than assumed, and that the transformative promise of transparency needs
to be reconsidered in this light.
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1. Introduction
This article analyzes the relationship between transparency and accountability in the multilateral climate regime
established under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In a widely acclaimed
development, a new agreement was adopted in Paris in December 2015 to apply to the post-2020 phase of collective
action to address climate change. The Paris Agreement, which entered into force in November 2016, embodies a
“pledge-and-review” approach to climate action, with individual country input to a shared global effort taking the form
of “nationally determined contributions” (NDCs).
Under this approach, transparency of action and (ﬁnancial, technological, and capacity-building) support now takes
center stage with an “enhanced transparency framework” made a key pillar of the Agreement. Much hope is being
pinned on a multilaterally agreed transparency system to generate and share information about countries’ actions.
Transparency is assumed to be vital to making visible who is doing what in this context, thus facilitating holding
countries to account for their action or inaction. Through such holding to account, it is also assumed that transparency
will enhance countries’ trust in each other, thereby also improving the prospects for ambitious global climate action.
Is the climate regime’s transparency system realizing such high hopes? In particular, does transparency further
accountability in this context? This is a timely and urgent question with high scholarly and policy currency, yet it
remains little analyzed. Given the continual evoking of the need for transparency in contested arenas of global
governance such as climate change, it is striking that the relationship between transparency and accountability remains
more assumed than scrutinized.
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Our aim in this article is two-fold: ﬁrst, to develop an analytical lens through which to (re)conceptualize the
relationship between transparency and accountability; and second, to apply this lens to assessing this relationship
within multilateral climate politics. This application of our framework to the climate realm is intended to be
exploratory, rather than a comprehensive empirical assessment of UNFCCC transparency arrangements to date.
Because the details of the enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement are still subject to negotiation,
we focus largely on existing UNFCCC transparency arrangements in our analysis. Given that these arrangements are
themselves relatively recent, little analysis has been conducted on how they are functioning, particularly in the academic
literature. Thus, it is timely to undertake such an exploratory analysis, given that the transparency framework of the
Paris Agreement will build on existing arrangements.
Our empirical analysis is based on primary and secondary literature. The most important primary sources we draw
on are UNFCCC decisions taken by parties on the scope and design of transparency arrangements, as well as country
submissions on transparency-related issues to the UNFCCC prior to speciﬁc meetings. We also draw on intermittent
observation of UNFCCC negotiating sessions on the transparency framework over the period 2013–2016.1
The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews diverse conceptualizations of accountability and transparency
(and their relationship) within existing international relations and global environmental governance literature.
Drawing on this review, it advances an analytical framework through which to assess the transparency-accountability
relationship. Section 3 provides an overview of the transparency arrangements developed within the UNFCCC,
including those in the Paris Agreement. Section 4 then applies our analytical framework to assessing the relationship
between transparency and accountability in multilateral climate politics. In Section 5, we present our conclusions.
Our analysis suggests that rather than standing apart from or helping to mitigate accountability conﬂicts,
transparency arrangements mirror such conﬂicts in their scope and design, with implications for the transformative
potential of transparency. We conclude by drawing out these implications further and outlining elements of a future
research agenda on the accountability–transparency relationship.
2. Accountability and transparency: Conceptualizing the links
Individually, the concepts of transparency and accountability have been the subject of increasing scholarly attention
in recent years. While transparency has recently received more attention in global environmental governance
(Langley 2001; Hale 2008; Gupta 2008, 2010; Gupta & Mason 2014), accountability has a signiﬁcantly longer
pedigree in this and related ﬁelds (e.g. Keohane 2006; Bovens 2007; Ebrahim & Weisband 2007; Newell 2008;
Biermann & Gupta 2011). With regard to examining the relationship between the two, however, we remain largely
in the realm of unexamined assertions (but see Fox 2007). The two terms are sometimes used interchangeably or
transparency is simply assumed to be an essential prerequisite for greater accountability. How this relationship works
in practice, and whether greater transparency does indeed further accountability has not yet been systematically
analyzed.
In assessing this relationship, we can begin from two distinct vantage points: that of transparency or that of
accountability. From the vantage point of transparency, one relevant starting question is whether, and under what
conditions, speciﬁc instances of transparency actually aim to further accountability, or whether distinct (and potentially
competing) rationales are driving the uptake of transparency in global governance instead.
In an era of neoliberal environmental governance, that is, governance characterized by a move toward market-
based solutions, privatization, and reliance on voluntary approaches (Bernstein 2001), diverse rationales beyond
furthering democratic accountability may well drive the growing embrace of transparency. These include, for example:
a marketization rationale, whereby disclosure of information is essential to facilitating the creation and/or functioning
of markets in environmental services; a privatization rationale, whereby disclosure facilitates the investment decisions
of private actors as a means to bolster private authority; or a technocratic rationale, whereby disclosure of “more and
better information” is intended to improve and rationalize (bureaucratic) decisionmaking. From a transparency
vantage point, one can then analyze whether the uptake of disclosure is even driven by a rationale to enhance
democratic accountability, and, if so, whether such an accountability rationale is being superseded in practice by
alternative rationales for disclosure (Gupta & Mason 2016).
We could also analyze the relationship between transparency and accountability from the vantage point of
accountability. Here, the point of departure would be how accountability is being conceptualized and
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operationalized in a given issue area. Such an analysis can then illuminate what the prospects might be for
transparency to serve as a mechanism by which to further accountability, once the contours of a given accountability
relationship are clearer.
This latter vantage point is the one we adopt in this article. Our focus, furthermore, is on accountability in
multilateral state-led governance, that is, state-to-state accountability, but in a manner that goes beyond a principal–
agent or delegated accountability model assumed to prevail in (domestic) public accountability settings. In multilateral
state-to-state accountability contexts, the same actor is both principal and agent (given that states demand
accountability from, and are accountable to, each other). We consider a focus on state-to-state accountability to be
important, given an evolving global environmental governance research context that increasingly prioritizes the study
of private and hybrid governance (e.g. Bäckstrand 2008; Chan & Pattberg 2008) and the accountability challenges
herein. Much effort has been expended within recent literature on developing typologies of “plural accountabilities”
(Bäckstrand 2006) discernible in multi-actor, hybrid, and networked modes of environmental governance. While this
has yielded many useful insights, we see two risks here. First, such a focus may distract attention from the continuing
need to scrutinize state-to-state accountability, particularly in contested issue areas such as climate change. Second,
there is a risk of proliferating typologies. Our aim here is thus to draw on existing insights in the accountability literature
to develop an analytical framework that is broadly applicable across diverse governance contexts. Furthermore, we are
interested in integrating a systematic assessment of the transparency-accountability relationship into such an analytical
framework.
We turn next to outlining this framework, which we develop by ﬁrst disaggregating the component elements of
accountability, and then outlining the associated transparency dimensions for each.
2.1. Conceptualizing accountability: Disaggregating its component elements
In exploring the relationship between transparency and accountability, we take here as our point of departure two long-
acknowledged aspects of accountability relations: answerability and enforceability. As articulated by Newell, drawing on
Schedler et al. (1999), answerability implies “both the right to… demand a justiﬁcation for (in-)action on the part of an
institution exercising power and the expectation on the part of an accountability ‘provider’ that it has to provide an
account of its (in-)actions in the public name” (Newell 2008, p. 124; italics added). Enforceability refers to “the means
to secure accountability: the ability to realize accountability claims and the capacity to penalize non-responsive
behaviour with sanctions of one form or another” (Newell 2008, p. 124).
While this parsing out of accountability into answerability and enforceability is a useful point of departure, it is
necessary, in our view, to further disaggregate each in order to assess the role that transparency might play in furthering
accountability. We thus identify ﬁve disaggregated elements that together, we argue, constitute the “answerability” and
“enforceability” aspects of accountability. These include: relations, standards, judgments, sanctions, and redress (see also
Biermann & Gupta 2011). We understand each of these to mean the following:
• Relations: agreeing on who is to be held to account (and to whom);
• Standards: agreeing on standards of performance against which to be held to account (i.e. agreeing on
accountability for what);
• Judgments: agreeing on a process by which to assess if standards are being met (i.e. the how of accountability);
• Sanctions: agreeing on (legal, reputational, ﬁnancial) penalties if standards are not met; and
• Redress: agreeing on the scope and modalities of liability and compensation for harm inﬂicted as a result of
standards not being met.
The ﬁrst three elements constitute the answerability component of accountability, with the latter two constituting
the enforceability component. Securing answerability necessarily requires agreement on who is to be held to account
and by whom, according to what standards of performance and by what process of judging whether the performance
standards are being met. Enforceability likewise requires the ability to sanction non-compliant behavior if standards
are not met, and the prospect of holding liable and securing compensation for harm done as a result of standards not
being met.
If these are the disaggregated elements of an accountability relationship, how might transparency serve to further
accountability? We turn next to this aspect.
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2.2. Furthering accountability through transparency
We utilize the above disaggregated conception of accountability to identify corresponding transparency arrangements in
a multilateral or transnational governance context, which would be required for transparency to be able to further
accountability.We do so by categorizing transparency arrangements according to the same disaggregated accountability
elements, and identifying key questions to be asked about such arrangements, relating back to the “who, about what,
and how” of accountability. This yields the analytical framework in Figure 1.
This analytical framework strengthens existing analyzes of accountability in several important ways. First, in
disaggregating the component elements of accountability, the framework brings together under one umbrella, and
makes explicit, the core elements of accountability and their inter-relationships to each other.
Second, the framework highlights that these core set of accountability components hold across a diverse array of
governance contexts, whether global, multilateral, transnational, hybrid, or networked settings, insofar as the
accountability questions associated with each are the same across all such settings, even if the answers may vary. Thus,
the framework can be used to identify and analyze the nature, scope, design, and degree of institutionalization of these
core accountability elements in diverse governance settings.
Third, the framework allows us to unpack the ex-ante and ex-post dimensions of accountability, an aspect that is
particularly timely and is less elaborated in existing analyses. Ex-post accountability has long been associated with
multilateral environmental agreements in the form of reporting and review related to the implementation of
obligations (Raustiala 2001), as well as in seeking to hold to account for harm done (often characterized as a “liability
model of accountability;” see Mason 2008). There is, nonetheless, a growing need for, and a speciﬁc set of challenges
associated with, ex-ante accountability in contested areas of anticipatory governance, such as climate change (Biermann
& Gupta 2011). Ex-ante accountability in the climate context comes into play when assessing (and holding countries to
account) not only for existing obligations but also for (the ambition and fairness of) their intended actions in the future.
Yet such an enterprise is fraught with fundamental scientiﬁc and political uncertainties. Ex-ante accountability is thus
likely to be a site of conﬂict and negotiation inmultilateral climate politics in the years ahead, but has received relatively
little sustained scholarly attention.
Finally, as its main intended contribution here, the analytical framework permits a more systematic assessment
of how, and under what conditions, transparency arrangements might further accountability. The disaggregation
into ﬁve component elements of accountability helps to discern a set of associated transparency questions (listed
in Figure 1) to be scrutinized in any given instance to ascertain how transparency might help further
accountability.
In doing so, our analytical framework also makes clear that the role of transparency in accountability extends
beyond what we refer to as the judgment stage, that is, beyond a scrutiny of the reporting and review system as
Figure 1 Furthering accountability through transparency: Analytical framework.
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constituting the sum total of this relationship. Such reporting and review systems do constitute a critical core of
transparency, as they specify the institutional arrangements and processes through which information is generated,
shared, and reviewed, and hence, country actions are made visible. As we see it, however, it is equally critical to engage
with the prior component elements of accountability, namely the relations and standards of performance (the “who and
what”), and how they shape transparency.
In highly contested global environmental governance challenges such as climate change, ﬁrst-order questions
pertaining to “who is to be accountable to whom for what” fundamentally shape the design of review (i.e. the how
of transparency arrangements). Thus, our point of departure here is that focusing only on the judgment phase risks
missing out on the broader context that shapes the transparency–accountability relationship and the prospects for
transparency to do its transformative work. In taking a more holistic view, this analytical framework allows us to
comprehensively explore whether and how the scope and practices of transparency are shaped by, reﬂect, or help
mitigate the contested politics of accountability in global environmental governance.
We turn next to assessing the transparency–accountability relationship in multilateral climate politics, with one
important caveat. While our analytical framework above includes, for the sake of completeness, both the answerability
and enforceability components of the accountability–transparency relationship, we focus in the empirical section of this
article on the answerability dimension of this relationship. This is because the enforcement component (even sanctions,
much less liability for not meeting agreed-upon standards of performance) is largely absent or only very vaguely
delineated in UNFCCC provisions, also under the Paris Agreement (except for the Kyoto Protocol; see Section 4.2).
There is correspondingly little to no envisaged role for transparency in the enforceability component of accountability
relations in this speciﬁc multilateral context.
As a result, we focus on the three disaggregated elements of the answerability dimension of accountability (relations,
standards, and judgments) and the link to transparency herein. Where relevant, we touch upon the role of transparency
arrangements in reaching a judgment about compliancewith agreed-upon standards of performance (as the culmination
of reporting and review processes, i.e, the judgment phase). Such a judgment then feeds into the UNFCCC’s largely
facilitative compliance arrangements, where they exist, as a distinct and prior step to enforcement, insofar as these
arrangements focus on facilitating the process of meeting agreed-upon performance standards, rather than on sanctioning
or ascribing liability and redress for lack of adherence to agreed-upon standards of performance. Thus, our analysis
covers answerability (which can culminate in a judgment of compliance or non-compliance) but not enforcement,
understood as sanctions and/or liability for lack of compliance.
3. Transparency arrangements in the multilateral climate regime: An overview
Based on the obligations contained in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, elaborate transparency arrangements have
been developed under the climate regime over the past two decades. As regimes are rarely constructed on a blank slate,
the transparency framework of the Paris Agreement will build on these arrangements. This section describes these
transparency arrangements brieﬂy in order to analyze their scope and workings in Section 4 through the lens of our
analytical framework. We organize the overview in four subsections related to transparency arrangements under: (i)
the Framework Convention itself, (ii) its Kyoto Protocol, (iii) the Cancún Agreements, and (iv) the Paris Agreement.
3.1. Transparency arrangements under the UNFCCC
The UNFCCC calls on all countries to submit “national communications” in which they report on progress with
implementation of various climate-related obligations under the Convention. By the end of 2016, all developed
country (Annex I) parties had submitted their sixth national communications (which were due in January 2014).2
These national communications by developed countries are subject to regular in-depth reviews by expert review
teams (ERTs), comprising of experts nominated by parties and, at times, from intergovernmental organizations
(UNFCCC 2014). The ERTs review the data and information provided by countries and assess progress made. The
process is intended to be non-political, facilitative, and transparent. The reviews usually include in-country visits in
addition to desk-based studies, although centralized reviews are possible for economies in transition with low
emission levels. The reports are forwarded to the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), and are
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made publicly available. National communications are also required from developing countries under the UNFCCC,
but these are not subject to review.
In addition to national communications, all parties to the UNFCCC need to communicate national greenhouse gas
(GHG) inventories. Developed country parties need to prepare inventory reports that follow a common format and
guidelines, and adhere to procedural reporting standards of transparency, consistency, comparability, completeness,
and accuracy (UNFCCC 2013). Since 2003, these GHG inventory reports have also been subject to a technical review
process in which the UNFCCC secretariat carries out initial checks of individual reports and synthesizes the
information from all reports, followed by detailed reviews by ERTs (UNFCCC 2014). Such reviews include desk-based
and centralized reviews, as well as in-country visits. The review reports are made publicly available. Developing country
parties are not required to submit separate inventory reports, but they are required to include the results of their GHG
inventories in their national communications.
3.2. Transparency arrangements under the Kyoto Protocol
Building on the reporting and review requirements of the UNFCCC noted above, the Kyoto Protocol introduced
further transparency arrangements for Annex I parties, requiring them to report annually on (and demonstrate
compliance with) their Kyoto emission reduction targets. Given the crucial role of emissions accounting for the
environmental integrity of the Kyoto Protocol, the information in these reports is more detailed than that required
for national communications under the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2005a). Further details to be included in such reporting
are use of the Kyoto Protocol’s market-based ﬂexibility mechanisms, policies and measures, the provision of ﬁnance,
and the transfer of technology.
In addition to the regular report, the Kyoto Protocol also requires several “one-off” reports fromAnnex I countries:
(i) an initial report clarifying parties’ “assigned amounts” (i.e. allowed level of emissions) under the Protocol; (ii) a
report on the “demonstrable progress” made with the implementation of commitments by 2005; and (iii) a “true-up
period” report, through which compliance with Kyoto emission reduction obligations can be assessed.
With the exception of demonstrable progress reports, all of these reports are reviewed by ERTs. Thus, ERTs are
responsible for a number of speciﬁc reviews (UNFCCC 2005b):
• Annual review of GHG inventory reports: This review, which includes the review under the Framework
Convention for developed country Kyoto parties, starts with an initial check for completeness, timeliness,
consistency, accuracy, transparency, and comparability, followed by an in-depth review that may involve an
in-country visit. ERTs can identify problems and, if necessary, apply “adjustments” to the emissions data.
• Periodic review of national communications: This review, which also covers the review under the Convention for
developed country parties, includes an in-country visit, along with centralized or desk-based reviews. National
communications are checked for completeness, and ERTs carry out a detailed examination of their various
sections. The report needs to include a technical review and discuss potential problems identiﬁed in the national
communication, linked to the criteria of transparency, completeness, and timeliness.
• Review of initial reports:This review, which was carried out in 2007–2009, focused on the inventory and systems in
place for estimating emissions and keeping track of transfers of emission units to ensure that the appropriate
systems were in place at the start of the Protocol’s ﬁrst commitment period in 2008.
• Review of “true-up period” reports: This review, carried out in 2015, was conducted to determine whether parties
had complied with their Kyoto targets.3 ERTs checked whether the information was provided according to
guidelines, whether it was consistent with other information sources, and whether a country met its target.
Expert review teams are thusmandated to carry out technical assessments and are also permitted to raise “questions
of implementation,” although they are to refrain from political judgments. If these questions cannot be resolved, the
ERT can refer the matter to the Kyoto Protocol’s Compliance Committee, which may adopt a variety of measures to
promote compliance.
In this context, it is useful to brieﬂy note the compliance mechanism established by the Kyoto Protocol, given
speciﬁc emission reduction obligations for Annex I parties contained herein. This mechanism consists of a Compliance
Committee with a Facilitative Branch and an Enforcement Branch. The compliance procedure of the Kyoto Protocol
can be “triggered” in three ways (UNFCCC 2005c): (i) ERTs may, as noted above, raise questions of implementation
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constituting the sum total of this relationship. Such reporting and review systems do constitute a critical core of
transparency, as they specify the institutional arrangements and processes through which information is generated,
shared, and reviewed, and hence, country actions are made visible. As we see it, however, it is equally critical to engage
with the prior component elements of accountability, namely the relations and standards of performance (the “who and
what”), and how they shape transparency.
In highly contested global environmental governance challenges such as climate change, ﬁrst-order questions
pertaining to “who is to be accountable to whom for what” fundamentally shape the design of review (i.e. the how
of transparency arrangements). Thus, our point of departure here is that focusing only on the judgment phase risks
missing out on the broader context that shapes the transparency–accountability relationship and the prospects for
transparency to do its transformative work. In taking a more holistic view, this analytical framework allows us to
comprehensively explore whether and how the scope and practices of transparency are shaped by, reﬂect, or help
mitigate the contested politics of accountability in global environmental governance.
We turn next to assessing the transparency–accountability relationship in multilateral climate politics, with one
important caveat. While our analytical framework above includes, for the sake of completeness, both the answerability
and enforceability components of the accountability–transparency relationship, we focus in the empirical section of this
article on the answerability dimension of this relationship. This is because the enforcement component (even sanctions,
much less liability for not meeting agreed-upon standards of performance) is largely absent or only very vaguely
delineated in UNFCCC provisions, also under the Paris Agreement (except for the Kyoto Protocol; see Section 4.2).
There is correspondingly little to no envisaged role for transparency in the enforceability component of accountability
relations in this speciﬁc multilateral context.
As a result, we focus on the three disaggregated elements of the answerability dimension of accountability (relations,
standards, and judgments) and the link to transparency herein. Where relevant, we touch upon the role of transparency
arrangements in reaching a judgment about compliancewith agreed-upon standards of performance (as the culmination
of reporting and review processes, i.e, the judgment phase). Such a judgment then feeds into the UNFCCC’s largely
facilitative compliance arrangements, where they exist, as a distinct and prior step to enforcement, insofar as these
arrangements focus on facilitating the process of meeting agreed-upon performance standards, rather than on sanctioning
or ascribing liability and redress for lack of adherence to agreed-upon standards of performance. Thus, our analysis
covers answerability (which can culminate in a judgment of compliance or non-compliance) but not enforcement,
understood as sanctions and/or liability for lack of compliance.
3. Transparency arrangements in the multilateral climate regime: An overview
Based on the obligations contained in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, elaborate transparency arrangements have
been developed under the climate regime over the past two decades. As regimes are rarely constructed on a blank slate,
the transparency framework of the Paris Agreement will build on these arrangements. This section describes these
transparency arrangements brieﬂy in order to analyze their scope and workings in Section 4 through the lens of our
analytical framework. We organize the overview in four subsections related to transparency arrangements under: (i)
the Framework Convention itself, (ii) its Kyoto Protocol, (iii) the Cancún Agreements, and (iv) the Paris Agreement.
3.1. Transparency arrangements under the UNFCCC
The UNFCCC calls on all countries to submit “national communications” in which they report on progress with
implementation of various climate-related obligations under the Convention. By the end of 2016, all developed
country (Annex I) parties had submitted their sixth national communications (which were due in January 2014).2
These national communications by developed countries are subject to regular in-depth reviews by expert review
teams (ERTs), comprising of experts nominated by parties and, at times, from intergovernmental organizations
(UNFCCC 2014). The ERTs review the data and information provided by countries and assess progress made. The
process is intended to be non-political, facilitative, and transparent. The reviews usually include in-country visits in
addition to desk-based studies, although centralized reviews are possible for economies in transition with low
emission levels. The reports are forwarded to the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), and are
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made publicly available. National communications are also required from developing countries under the UNFCCC,
but these are not subject to review.
In addition to national communications, all parties to the UNFCCC need to communicate national greenhouse gas
(GHG) inventories. Developed country parties need to prepare inventory reports that follow a common format and
guidelines, and adhere to procedural reporting standards of transparency, consistency, comparability, completeness,
and accuracy (UNFCCC 2013). Since 2003, these GHG inventory reports have also been subject to a technical review
process in which the UNFCCC secretariat carries out initial checks of individual reports and synthesizes the
information from all reports, followed by detailed reviews by ERTs (UNFCCC 2014). Such reviews include desk-based
and centralized reviews, as well as in-country visits. The review reports are made publicly available. Developing country
parties are not required to submit separate inventory reports, but they are required to include the results of their GHG
inventories in their national communications.
3.2. Transparency arrangements under the Kyoto Protocol
Building on the reporting and review requirements of the UNFCCC noted above, the Kyoto Protocol introduced
further transparency arrangements for Annex I parties, requiring them to report annually on (and demonstrate
compliance with) their Kyoto emission reduction targets. Given the crucial role of emissions accounting for the
environmental integrity of the Kyoto Protocol, the information in these reports is more detailed than that required
for national communications under the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2005a). Further details to be included in such reporting
are use of the Kyoto Protocol’s market-based ﬂexibility mechanisms, policies and measures, the provision of ﬁnance,
and the transfer of technology.
In addition to the regular report, the Kyoto Protocol also requires several “one-off” reports fromAnnex I countries:
(i) an initial report clarifying parties’ “assigned amounts” (i.e. allowed level of emissions) under the Protocol; (ii) a
report on the “demonstrable progress” made with the implementation of commitments by 2005; and (iii) a “true-up
period” report, through which compliance with Kyoto emission reduction obligations can be assessed.
With the exception of demonstrable progress reports, all of these reports are reviewed by ERTs. Thus, ERTs are
responsible for a number of speciﬁc reviews (UNFCCC 2005b):
• Annual review of GHG inventory reports: This review, which includes the review under the Framework
Convention for developed country Kyoto parties, starts with an initial check for completeness, timeliness,
consistency, accuracy, transparency, and comparability, followed by an in-depth review that may involve an
in-country visit. ERTs can identify problems and, if necessary, apply “adjustments” to the emissions data.
• Periodic review of national communications: This review, which also covers the review under the Convention for
developed country parties, includes an in-country visit, along with centralized or desk-based reviews. National
communications are checked for completeness, and ERTs carry out a detailed examination of their various
sections. The report needs to include a technical review and discuss potential problems identiﬁed in the national
communication, linked to the criteria of transparency, completeness, and timeliness.
• Review of initial reports:This review, which was carried out in 2007–2009, focused on the inventory and systems in
place for estimating emissions and keeping track of transfers of emission units to ensure that the appropriate
systems were in place at the start of the Protocol’s ﬁrst commitment period in 2008.
• Review of “true-up period” reports: This review, carried out in 2015, was conducted to determine whether parties
had complied with their Kyoto targets.3 ERTs checked whether the information was provided according to
guidelines, whether it was consistent with other information sources, and whether a country met its target.
Expert review teams are thusmandated to carry out technical assessments and are also permitted to raise “questions
of implementation,” although they are to refrain from political judgments. If these questions cannot be resolved, the
ERT can refer the matter to the Kyoto Protocol’s Compliance Committee, which may adopt a variety of measures to
promote compliance.
In this context, it is useful to brieﬂy note the compliance mechanism established by the Kyoto Protocol, given
speciﬁc emission reduction obligations for Annex I parties contained herein. This mechanism consists of a Compliance
Committee with a Facilitative Branch and an Enforcement Branch. The compliance procedure of the Kyoto Protocol
can be “triggered” in three ways (UNFCCC 2005c): (i) ERTs may, as noted above, raise questions of implementation
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with regard to the reports submitted; (ii) a party may refer itself to the Compliance Committee; and (iii) another party
may refer a party. Themandate of the Enforcement Branch is quite broad, and includes compliance with the emissions-
related commitments of Annex I parties, as well as key reporting requirements. If a party is found to be non-compliant,
it may need to draft a compliance action plan, be barred from participation in the Protocol’s ﬂexibility mechanisms, or
be required to further reduce emissions in the second commitment period of the Protocol (2013–2020).
The Facilitative Branch is mandated to address any questions of compliance not addressed by the Enforcement
Branch, and is intended to provide an early warning function for non-compliance with emission targets. Its available
means are softer than those of the Enforcement Branch, and it is mainly aimed at providing advice and facilitating
assistance. Since its commencement in 2006, the Compliance Committee has successfully dealt with several cases of
non-compliance, but these have mainly related to methodological issues and reporting rather than to the Kyoto targets
themselves (Doelle 2012).
3.3. The transparency arrangements of the Cancún Agreements
The 2009 Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC 2009) not only introduced new, voluntary climate action pledges (for both
developed and developing countries) for the period leading up to 2020, but also signaled a new direction for
transparency arrangements under the UNFCCC. These arrangements were ﬂeshed out in the Cancún Agreements
adopted one year later (UNFCCC 2010). The new transparency arrangements build on the existing system under
the UNFCCC (Section 3.1), with more elaborate rules for developed countries. However, they also introduced new
reporting and review obligations and processes for developing countries.
As per the Cancún Agreements, in addition to already required national communications and annual GHG
emissons inventory reports, developed country parties are expected to submit Biennial Reports (BRs) on progress with
achieving emission reductions and providing ﬁnance, technology, and capacity-building support to developing
countries. The reports follow a speciﬁc format and guidelines (UNFCCC 2011a). BRs are subject to a process of
international veriﬁcation, termed “international assessment and review” (IAR), every two years, either independently
or together with national communications.
International assessment and review includes two separate steps: a technical review and a multilateral assessment.
Common guidelines for the technical review of national communications, BRs, and GHG inventories were agreed in
2014 (UNFCCC 2014). When submitted simultaneously, BRs and national communications are subject to a joint
in-country review; otherwise, a centralized review is carried out. Technical reviews examine in-depth issues not covered
in the inventory review, including information related to emission reduction pledges and the provision of support. The
review focuses on transparency, completeness, timeliness, and adherence to reporting guidelines. ERTs can ask
questions, request information from the party, and offer advice.
The multilateral assessment, the second step in the IAR process, takes place as a state-to-state peer exchange in the
UNFCCC context, where the outcomes of the technical review, an Annex I party’s reports, and supplementary
information on the achievement of the party’s emission reduction target are considered. Any other parties can submit
written questions or raise questions in a session of the SBI devoted to this process. The UNFCCC secretariat drafts a
record of the questions and answers, and the SBI forwards conclusions to the Conference of the Parties (COP) to
the UNFCCC. The ﬁrst round of multilateral assessments took place at UNFCCC SBI sessions in 2014 and 2015,
resulting in a review of 43 developed country parties. The second round started in Marrakesh in November 2016 with
a review of 24 parties.
As part of the Cancún Agreements, parties also agreed that developing countries – except for least-developed
countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS) – should submit new Biennial Update Reports (BURs)
every two years from 2014 onwards, either in conjunction with already required national communications or separately
(UNFCCC 2010). BURs should include information on, among others, national circumstances and institutional
arrangements, mitigation actions, and ﬁnancial, technical, and capacity needs (UNFCCC 2011a).
In a signﬁcant departure from earlier processes, these reports are also to be considered internationally, via a process of
“international consultation and analysis” (ICA), in order to “increase transparency of [developing country] mitigation
actions and their effects” (UNFCCC 2010, para. 63). The ICA process is expressly intended to be non-punitive and
non-intrusive, and to respect national sovereignty. For the purposes of ICA, LDCs and SIDS can be analyzed in
groups, rather than individually. The process in an ICA somewhat mirrors the two-step IAR process described above
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for Annex I countries. It starts with an analysis of a party’s BUR by a team of technical experts in consultation with a
party (UNFCCC 2011a). Based on the experts’ report, a multilateral state-to-state “facilitative sharing of views” takes
place, which includes questions and answers between parties. The ﬁrst such sessions took place during two SBI workshops
in 2016, covering a total of 20 developing country parties (including Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea).4
3.4. The Paris Agreement’s enhanced transparency framework
With the success of the Paris Agreement hinging upon the effective implementation of the non-legally binding NDCs,
transparency plays a central role in the new agreement. The Paris Agreement establishes an “enhanced transparency
framework” applicable to all parties (Article 13). The framework provides for “built-in ﬂexibility” in applying a
common framework, taking into account parties’ different capacities.
Although details of the transparency framework are still under negotiation, the Paris Agreement and its
accompanying Decision (UNFCCC 2015) offer some initial insights into how the framework will be designed. First,
the new transparency arrangements are to build on the existing ones under the UNFCCC, meaning that elements of
the existing reporting and review process will be drawn upon – although which elements will be retained remains
uncertain. Moreover, the new system will ultimately supersede existing transparency arrangements (UNFCCC 2015,
para. 99). Second, the framework applies to both “action” (i.e. measures to mitigate or adapt to climate change) and
“support” (i.e. ﬁnancial, technological, and capacity-building assistance), making the latter a clearer and more
prominent focus of UNFCCC transparency arrangements. Speciﬁcally, the Agreement requires developed countries
to report biennially on the support provided, and encourages other parties providing support to do so on a voluntary
basis. It also envisages, for the ﬁrst time, that developing countries should report on support received.
Third, in terms of reporting, the Paris Agreement speciﬁes that each party needs to submit annual GHG inventory
reports, as well as “[i]nformation necessary to track progress made in implementing and achieving its [NDC]” (Article
13.7) on a biennial basis (except for LDCs and SIDS; see UNFCCC 2015). Fourth, like the arrangements established by
the Cancún Agreements, the international review process will include twomain elements: a technical expert review and
a process of “facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress.” The technical expert review is to identify “areas of
improvement” for the party under review and examine the consistency of the reported information with multilaterally
agreed guidelines. The state-to-state multilateral consideration of progress focuses on the implementation and
achievement of NDCs, as well as the obligations related to providing climate ﬁnance.
4. Enhancing accountability through transparency: Assessing the prospects
In this section, we apply the analytical framework developed in Section 2 to assess whether and how these evolving
transparency arrangements serve to further accountability. As such, we analyze, in greater detail, the relations,
standards, and judgments that constitute evolving multilateral climate transparency arrangements.
4.1. Relations
This crucial element of the accountability problématique goes to the heart of whether and how transparency is able to
further accountability in international climate governance. TheUNFCCC context is one of state-to-state accountability,
so the key question here is who, that is, which states should be accountable. This question lies at the heart of the notion
of differentiation in the UNFCCC context.
Differential treatment of developed and developing countries has consistently been the make-or-break issue in
multilateral climate politics (Rajamani 2013). It has shaped the fate and effectiveness of the UNFCCC regime, whether
as a primary reason for United States President George W. Bush to withdraw from participation in the Kyoto Protocol
in 2001, or in contributing to the breakdown of the Copenhagen meeting in 2009. Differentiation is a lightning rod for
conﬂict because it underpins fundamental disagreements about historical and continuing responsibility and burden
sharing for climate actions. These conﬂicts over differentiating between developed and developing countries over
who has to do what necessarily spill over into who has to be transparent about what.
As we see from the discussion in the previous section, transparency arrangements under both the UNFCCC and the
Kyoto Protocol have been consistently differentiated. For instance, while national communications have to be
submitted by all countries, the reporting requirements and timing are more ﬂexible for LDCs and SIDS. Moreover,
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with regard to the reports submitted; (ii) a party may refer itself to the Compliance Committee; and (iii) another party
may refer a party. Themandate of the Enforcement Branch is quite broad, and includes compliance with the emissions-
related commitments of Annex I parties, as well as key reporting requirements. If a party is found to be non-compliant,
it may need to draft a compliance action plan, be barred from participation in the Protocol’s ﬂexibility mechanisms, or
be required to further reduce emissions in the second commitment period of the Protocol (2013–2020).
The Facilitative Branch is mandated to address any questions of compliance not addressed by the Enforcement
Branch, and is intended to provide an early warning function for non-compliance with emission targets. Its available
means are softer than those of the Enforcement Branch, and it is mainly aimed at providing advice and facilitating
assistance. Since its commencement in 2006, the Compliance Committee has successfully dealt with several cases of
non-compliance, but these have mainly related to methodological issues and reporting rather than to the Kyoto targets
themselves (Doelle 2012).
3.3. The transparency arrangements of the Cancún Agreements
The 2009 Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC 2009) not only introduced new, voluntary climate action pledges (for both
developed and developing countries) for the period leading up to 2020, but also signaled a new direction for
transparency arrangements under the UNFCCC. These arrangements were ﬂeshed out in the Cancún Agreements
adopted one year later (UNFCCC 2010). The new transparency arrangements build on the existing system under
the UNFCCC (Section 3.1), with more elaborate rules for developed countries. However, they also introduced new
reporting and review obligations and processes for developing countries.
As per the Cancún Agreements, in addition to already required national communications and annual GHG
emissons inventory reports, developed country parties are expected to submit Biennial Reports (BRs) on progress with
achieving emission reductions and providing ﬁnance, technology, and capacity-building support to developing
countries. The reports follow a speciﬁc format and guidelines (UNFCCC 2011a). BRs are subject to a process of
international veriﬁcation, termed “international assessment and review” (IAR), every two years, either independently
or together with national communications.
International assessment and review includes two separate steps: a technical review and a multilateral assessment.
Common guidelines for the technical review of national communications, BRs, and GHG inventories were agreed in
2014 (UNFCCC 2014). When submitted simultaneously, BRs and national communications are subject to a joint
in-country review; otherwise, a centralized review is carried out. Technical reviews examine in-depth issues not covered
in the inventory review, including information related to emission reduction pledges and the provision of support. The
review focuses on transparency, completeness, timeliness, and adherence to reporting guidelines. ERTs can ask
questions, request information from the party, and offer advice.
The multilateral assessment, the second step in the IAR process, takes place as a state-to-state peer exchange in the
UNFCCC context, where the outcomes of the technical review, an Annex I party’s reports, and supplementary
information on the achievement of the party’s emission reduction target are considered. Any other parties can submit
written questions or raise questions in a session of the SBI devoted to this process. The UNFCCC secretariat drafts a
record of the questions and answers, and the SBI forwards conclusions to the Conference of the Parties (COP) to
the UNFCCC. The ﬁrst round of multilateral assessments took place at UNFCCC SBI sessions in 2014 and 2015,
resulting in a review of 43 developed country parties. The second round started in Marrakesh in November 2016 with
a review of 24 parties.
As part of the Cancún Agreements, parties also agreed that developing countries – except for least-developed
countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS) – should submit new Biennial Update Reports (BURs)
every two years from 2014 onwards, either in conjunction with already required national communications or separately
(UNFCCC 2010). BURs should include information on, among others, national circumstances and institutional
arrangements, mitigation actions, and ﬁnancial, technical, and capacity needs (UNFCCC 2011a).
In a signﬁcant departure from earlier processes, these reports are also to be considered internationally, via a process of
“international consultation and analysis” (ICA), in order to “increase transparency of [developing country] mitigation
actions and their effects” (UNFCCC 2010, para. 63). The ICA process is expressly intended to be non-punitive and
non-intrusive, and to respect national sovereignty. For the purposes of ICA, LDCs and SIDS can be analyzed in
groups, rather than individually. The process in an ICA somewhat mirrors the two-step IAR process described above
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for Annex I countries. It starts with an analysis of a party’s BUR by a team of technical experts in consultation with a
party (UNFCCC 2011a). Based on the experts’ report, a multilateral state-to-state “facilitative sharing of views” takes
place, which includes questions and answers between parties. The ﬁrst such sessions took place during two SBI workshops
in 2016, covering a total of 20 developing country parties (including Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea).4
3.4. The Paris Agreement’s enhanced transparency framework
With the success of the Paris Agreement hinging upon the effective implementation of the non-legally binding NDCs,
transparency plays a central role in the new agreement. The Paris Agreement establishes an “enhanced transparency
framework” applicable to all parties (Article 13). The framework provides for “built-in ﬂexibility” in applying a
common framework, taking into account parties’ different capacities.
Although details of the transparency framework are still under negotiation, the Paris Agreement and its
accompanying Decision (UNFCCC 2015) offer some initial insights into how the framework will be designed. First,
the new transparency arrangements are to build on the existing ones under the UNFCCC, meaning that elements of
the existing reporting and review process will be drawn upon – although which elements will be retained remains
uncertain. Moreover, the new system will ultimately supersede existing transparency arrangements (UNFCCC 2015,
para. 99). Second, the framework applies to both “action” (i.e. measures to mitigate or adapt to climate change) and
“support” (i.e. ﬁnancial, technological, and capacity-building assistance), making the latter a clearer and more
prominent focus of UNFCCC transparency arrangements. Speciﬁcally, the Agreement requires developed countries
to report biennially on the support provided, and encourages other parties providing support to do so on a voluntary
basis. It also envisages, for the ﬁrst time, that developing countries should report on support received.
Third, in terms of reporting, the Paris Agreement speciﬁes that each party needs to submit annual GHG inventory
reports, as well as “[i]nformation necessary to track progress made in implementing and achieving its [NDC]” (Article
13.7) on a biennial basis (except for LDCs and SIDS; see UNFCCC 2015). Fourth, like the arrangements established by
the Cancún Agreements, the international review process will include twomain elements: a technical expert review and
a process of “facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress.” The technical expert review is to identify “areas of
improvement” for the party under review and examine the consistency of the reported information with multilaterally
agreed guidelines. The state-to-state multilateral consideration of progress focuses on the implementation and
achievement of NDCs, as well as the obligations related to providing climate ﬁnance.
4. Enhancing accountability through transparency: Assessing the prospects
In this section, we apply the analytical framework developed in Section 2 to assess whether and how these evolving
transparency arrangements serve to further accountability. As such, we analyze, in greater detail, the relations,
standards, and judgments that constitute evolving multilateral climate transparency arrangements.
4.1. Relations
This crucial element of the accountability problématique goes to the heart of whether and how transparency is able to
further accountability in international climate governance. TheUNFCCC context is one of state-to-state accountability,
so the key question here is who, that is, which states should be accountable. This question lies at the heart of the notion
of differentiation in the UNFCCC context.
Differential treatment of developed and developing countries has consistently been the make-or-break issue in
multilateral climate politics (Rajamani 2013). It has shaped the fate and effectiveness of the UNFCCC regime, whether
as a primary reason for United States President George W. Bush to withdraw from participation in the Kyoto Protocol
in 2001, or in contributing to the breakdown of the Copenhagen meeting in 2009. Differentiation is a lightning rod for
conﬂict because it underpins fundamental disagreements about historical and continuing responsibility and burden
sharing for climate actions. These conﬂicts over differentiating between developed and developing countries over
who has to do what necessarily spill over into who has to be transparent about what.
As we see from the discussion in the previous section, transparency arrangements under both the UNFCCC and the
Kyoto Protocol have been consistently differentiated. For instance, while national communications have to be
submitted by all countries, the reporting requirements and timing are more ﬂexible for LDCs and SIDS. Moreover,
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the in-depth review process of such communications only applies to developed country parties. Similarly, while GHG
inventories have to be submitted by all parties, the requirements and timing are different and more ﬂexible for
developing country parties, and the technical review process only applies to developed country parties. Differentiation
is clearest in the transparency arrangements of the Kyoto Protocol, with elaborate reporting and review requirements
applicable only to Annex I parties.
Differentiation between developed and developing countries continued with the establishment of two separate
transparency systems in the Cancún Agreements (the IAR and ICA), following extensive and contested negotiations
over these systems both prior to and following Copenhagen. The terminology selected reﬂects such debates, with the
terms “assessment and review” of the IAR (applicable to developed countries) understood to signal greater stringency
and external oversight than the terms “consultation and analysis” of the ICA (applicable to developing countries) (e.g.
van Asselt et al. 2010).
Yet the IAR/ICA systems also embodied a move toward greater convergence in transparency arrangements –
especially when compared with the Kyoto Protocol – as it introduced some form of international scrutiny for the
domestic measures taken by developing countries (Dagnet et al. 2014). Before Copenhagen, this shift had been
advocated by developed countries, whereas countries like China and India had opposed such a move, insisting that
domestic veriﬁcation would be sufﬁcient (Dubash 2010; van Asselt et al. 2010). However, as part of a trade-off to
strengthen the transparency of support provided, developing countries agreed to greater international scrutiny
(Morgan et al. 2010).
In the negotiations leading up to the Paris Agreement, the fault line shifted slightly, with the group of like-minded
developing countries (LMDC) – a newly established negotiation coalition including China and India – insisting that the
(still differentiated) Cancún transparency arrangements should be the default for developing countries in the new
agreement (LMDC 2013), and the US calling for “a single system with built in ﬂexibility” (United States 2013, p. 5).
Ultimately, the Paris Agreement conﬁrmed the trend toward convergence through the introduction of an enhanced
transparency framework applicable to all countries. However, reﬂecting the contentious nature of differentiation, the
relevant provision includes references to “ﬂexibility” in implementing such an enhanced framework applicable to all,
with speciﬁc reference to countries’ capacities.
A crucial site of further negotiation now is precisely what such “ﬂexibility” entails (van Asselt et al. 2016). For
instance, is it related only to technical capacities, hence suggesting that at some moment ﬂexibility ends when capacities
have been sufﬁciently increased? As the US submission on transparency prior to theMarrakesh COP inNovember 2016
unequivocally stated: “ﬂexibility is for those developing countries that need it in light of their capacities…,” going on to
state that “ﬂexibility can be applied in a number of different ways across the transparency guidelines but provisions that
are not linked to capacity will not need ﬂexibility” (UNFCCC 2016, pp. 69–70; italics added). For many developing
countries, however, ﬂexibility is related not only to technical and human resource capacities but also to differential
burden sharing in the context of common but differentiated responsibilities. For instance, the LMDC group suggests
that all developing countries require ﬂexibility (UNFCCC 2016, p. 37), which they see as the basis for fair burden
sharing, including in reporting obligations.
Flexibility is thus emerging as a key site wherein the geopolitics of differentiation will continue to be contested,
negotiated, and revealed. It is also linked to a discernible shift in framings of differentiation in the UNFCCC in recent
years, sought in particular by Annex I parties. This is a shift away from an emphasis on the responsibility component of
the UNFCCC principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities” to differentiation
almost solely on the basis of capacities. While this focus on capacities does speak in pragmatic terms to developing
country needs, and hence is welcomed by many developing countries, including LDCs and SIDS (Rajamani 2016, p.
23), such a shift in framing away from responsibility to capacity has as yet understudied implications for the geopolitics
of multilateral climate cooperation.
Contestations over who should be transparent, and whether the transparency burden should be harmonized across
countries or remain differentiated, relates also to concerns voiced by developing countries that a common transparency
frameworkmay build pressure for greater uniformity of (mitigation) commitments. Even if the types ofmitigation actions
(e.g. economy-wide emission reduction targets or emissions intensity targets) that developed and developing countries
take on vary, developing countries are encouraged by the Paris Agreement to “move over time towards economy-wide
emission reduction or limitation targets” (Article 4.4), and a convergence in transparency arrangements may be a
precursor formore harmonizedmitigation action. Indeed, it is often stated thatmonitoring emissions is an important ﬁrst
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step and prerequisite for a country to take further mitigation action (see also Ellis &Moarif 2015, p. 17). The concern
that transparency might become a means to pressurize developing countries to take on more ambitious targets is
voiced in particular by the LMDC group. As India made clear in its submission prior to the Marrakesh COP in 2016:
[T]he transparency framework should not result in the creation of a top-down regime for the establishment of
subsequent NDCs or of creating de facto limitations on the extent to which Parties, particularly developing
countries, may exercise national determination in shaping and communicating their NDCs (UNFCCC 2016, p. 33).
These divergent views on the meaning and operationalization of the enhanced transparency framework in the context
of differentiation imply that countries do see a potentially transformative role for transparency, not only in revealing
but also shaping actions. Thus, the transparency system is not only deeply interlinked with the general debate on burden
sharing and its accountability dimensions, but might also help push this debate in speciﬁc directions.
This brief discussion highlights how transparency relationships under the UNFCCC reﬂect broader conﬂicts and
negotiations about who should be accountable to whom. We turn next to assessing the “accountability for what”
dimension, or the standards of performance against which countries seek to hold each other to account.
4.2. Standards
In the context of the multilateral climate regime, the standards to which transparency arrangements apply refer to
commitments of countries under the UNFCCC, including those under the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.
These relate to climate mitigation, adaptation, and (ﬁnancial, technological, and capacity-building) support, among
others. Thus, such commitments extend beyond speciﬁc emission reduction targets to include a wide spectrum of
climate actions and support.
As such, transparency arrangements shed light on diverse standards of performance against which country
performance is to be assessed. These include obligations, ﬁrst and foremost, to generate and report onmitigation-related
data, such as GHG emissions and removals (through inventories). Others include generating information on the
measures taken to implement (mitigation and adaptation) obligations (through national communications and BRs/BURs).
And some standards of performance relate to quantiﬁed emission reduction targets. For example, the reporting and
review processes under the Kyoto Protocol generate information that allows for the determination of whether a country
has met its Kyoto target. The IAR process allows for an assessment of the progressmade toward achieving the quantiﬁed
economy-wide emission reduction targets put forward by developed country parties, following the Copenhagen Accord.
In addition, transparency arrangements have increasingly started to require the reporting and review of information
related to various types of support provided to developing countries. Here too, the development of transparency
arrangements follows broader contestations inmultilateral climate politics. The UNFCCC requires developed countries
to provide new and additional ﬁnancial resources to developing countries, and makes the effective implementation of
commitments by developing country parties dependent on the effective implementation of commitments on ﬁnancial
and technological support by developed country parties (Article 4.6). Throughout the last decades, multilateral climate
talks have been marked by calls from developing countries for adequate, predictable, and sustainable ﬁnance from
developed countries.
Against this backdrop, developing countries have in recent years also consistently demanded improved
transparency of the (mainly ﬁnancial) support provided by developed countries (e.g. UNFCCC 2011b, p. 3; LMDC
2014, p. 10; South Africa 2014. p. 7), particularly following the announcement at the 2009 Copenhagen meeting that
developed countries would commit to jointly mobilizing US$100 billion annually by 2020. Further measures to
strengthen the transparency of (ﬁnancial) support have been agreed to as a consequence. Under the UNFCCC’s
Standing Committee on Finance, a biennial process now speciﬁcally reviews ﬂows of climate ﬁnance (UNFCCC
2011a). Moreover, developed countries need to provide information on the provision of ﬁnancial, technological, and
capacity-building support as part of their BRs (UNFCCC 2011a). The Paris Agreement continues this trend by
establishing a transparency framework for support as well as action. However, in another reﬂection of accountability
conﬂicts, the emphasis in practice remains on transparency of action, in particular, mitigation-related transparency
(e.g. as yet there is no agreed system to report on climate ﬁnance; see Roberts & Weikmans 2017).
So far, our discussion has highlighted standards of performance that the transparency framework seeks to make
visible. It is equally important to note here, however, the broader political contestations over accountability that are
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the in-depth review process of such communications only applies to developed country parties. Similarly, while GHG
inventories have to be submitted by all parties, the requirements and timing are different and more ﬂexible for
developing country parties, and the technical review process only applies to developed country parties. Differentiation
is clearest in the transparency arrangements of the Kyoto Protocol, with elaborate reporting and review requirements
applicable only to Annex I parties.
Differentiation between developed and developing countries continued with the establishment of two separate
transparency systems in the Cancún Agreements (the IAR and ICA), following extensive and contested negotiations
over these systems both prior to and following Copenhagen. The terminology selected reﬂects such debates, with the
terms “assessment and review” of the IAR (applicable to developed countries) understood to signal greater stringency
and external oversight than the terms “consultation and analysis” of the ICA (applicable to developing countries) (e.g.
van Asselt et al. 2010).
Yet the IAR/ICA systems also embodied a move toward greater convergence in transparency arrangements –
especially when compared with the Kyoto Protocol – as it introduced some form of international scrutiny for the
domestic measures taken by developing countries (Dagnet et al. 2014). Before Copenhagen, this shift had been
advocated by developed countries, whereas countries like China and India had opposed such a move, insisting that
domestic veriﬁcation would be sufﬁcient (Dubash 2010; van Asselt et al. 2010). However, as part of a trade-off to
strengthen the transparency of support provided, developing countries agreed to greater international scrutiny
(Morgan et al. 2010).
In the negotiations leading up to the Paris Agreement, the fault line shifted slightly, with the group of like-minded
developing countries (LMDC) – a newly established negotiation coalition including China and India – insisting that the
(still differentiated) Cancún transparency arrangements should be the default for developing countries in the new
agreement (LMDC 2013), and the US calling for “a single system with built in ﬂexibility” (United States 2013, p. 5).
Ultimately, the Paris Agreement conﬁrmed the trend toward convergence through the introduction of an enhanced
transparency framework applicable to all countries. However, reﬂecting the contentious nature of differentiation, the
relevant provision includes references to “ﬂexibility” in implementing such an enhanced framework applicable to all,
with speciﬁc reference to countries’ capacities.
A crucial site of further negotiation now is precisely what such “ﬂexibility” entails (van Asselt et al. 2016). For
instance, is it related only to technical capacities, hence suggesting that at some moment ﬂexibility ends when capacities
have been sufﬁciently increased? As the US submission on transparency prior to theMarrakesh COP inNovember 2016
unequivocally stated: “ﬂexibility is for those developing countries that need it in light of their capacities…,” going on to
state that “ﬂexibility can be applied in a number of different ways across the transparency guidelines but provisions that
are not linked to capacity will not need ﬂexibility” (UNFCCC 2016, pp. 69–70; italics added). For many developing
countries, however, ﬂexibility is related not only to technical and human resource capacities but also to differential
burden sharing in the context of common but differentiated responsibilities. For instance, the LMDC group suggests
that all developing countries require ﬂexibility (UNFCCC 2016, p. 37), which they see as the basis for fair burden
sharing, including in reporting obligations.
Flexibility is thus emerging as a key site wherein the geopolitics of differentiation will continue to be contested,
negotiated, and revealed. It is also linked to a discernible shift in framings of differentiation in the UNFCCC in recent
years, sought in particular by Annex I parties. This is a shift away from an emphasis on the responsibility component of
the UNFCCC principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities” to differentiation
almost solely on the basis of capacities. While this focus on capacities does speak in pragmatic terms to developing
country needs, and hence is welcomed by many developing countries, including LDCs and SIDS (Rajamani 2016, p.
23), such a shift in framing away from responsibility to capacity has as yet understudied implications for the geopolitics
of multilateral climate cooperation.
Contestations over who should be transparent, and whether the transparency burden should be harmonized across
countries or remain differentiated, relates also to concerns voiced by developing countries that a common transparency
frameworkmay build pressure for greater uniformity of (mitigation) commitments. Even if the types ofmitigation actions
(e.g. economy-wide emission reduction targets or emissions intensity targets) that developed and developing countries
take on vary, developing countries are encouraged by the Paris Agreement to “move over time towards economy-wide
emission reduction or limitation targets” (Article 4.4), and a convergence in transparency arrangements may be a
precursor formore harmonizedmitigation action. Indeed, it is often stated thatmonitoring emissions is an important ﬁrst
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step and prerequisite for a country to take further mitigation action (see also Ellis &Moarif 2015, p. 17). The concern
that transparency might become a means to pressurize developing countries to take on more ambitious targets is
voiced in particular by the LMDC group. As India made clear in its submission prior to the Marrakesh COP in 2016:
[T]he transparency framework should not result in the creation of a top-down regime for the establishment of
subsequent NDCs or of creating de facto limitations on the extent to which Parties, particularly developing
countries, may exercise national determination in shaping and communicating their NDCs (UNFCCC 2016, p. 33).
These divergent views on the meaning and operationalization of the enhanced transparency framework in the context
of differentiation imply that countries do see a potentially transformative role for transparency, not only in revealing
but also shaping actions. Thus, the transparency system is not only deeply interlinked with the general debate on burden
sharing and its accountability dimensions, but might also help push this debate in speciﬁc directions.
This brief discussion highlights how transparency relationships under the UNFCCC reﬂect broader conﬂicts and
negotiations about who should be accountable to whom. We turn next to assessing the “accountability for what”
dimension, or the standards of performance against which countries seek to hold each other to account.
4.2. Standards
In the context of the multilateral climate regime, the standards to which transparency arrangements apply refer to
commitments of countries under the UNFCCC, including those under the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.
These relate to climate mitigation, adaptation, and (ﬁnancial, technological, and capacity-building) support, among
others. Thus, such commitments extend beyond speciﬁc emission reduction targets to include a wide spectrum of
climate actions and support.
As such, transparency arrangements shed light on diverse standards of performance against which country
performance is to be assessed. These include obligations, ﬁrst and foremost, to generate and report onmitigation-related
data, such as GHG emissions and removals (through inventories). Others include generating information on the
measures taken to implement (mitigation and adaptation) obligations (through national communications and BRs/BURs).
And some standards of performance relate to quantiﬁed emission reduction targets. For example, the reporting and
review processes under the Kyoto Protocol generate information that allows for the determination of whether a country
has met its Kyoto target. The IAR process allows for an assessment of the progressmade toward achieving the quantiﬁed
economy-wide emission reduction targets put forward by developed country parties, following the Copenhagen Accord.
In addition, transparency arrangements have increasingly started to require the reporting and review of information
related to various types of support provided to developing countries. Here too, the development of transparency
arrangements follows broader contestations inmultilateral climate politics. The UNFCCC requires developed countries
to provide new and additional ﬁnancial resources to developing countries, and makes the effective implementation of
commitments by developing country parties dependent on the effective implementation of commitments on ﬁnancial
and technological support by developed country parties (Article 4.6). Throughout the last decades, multilateral climate
talks have been marked by calls from developing countries for adequate, predictable, and sustainable ﬁnance from
developed countries.
Against this backdrop, developing countries have in recent years also consistently demanded improved
transparency of the (mainly ﬁnancial) support provided by developed countries (e.g. UNFCCC 2011b, p. 3; LMDC
2014, p. 10; South Africa 2014. p. 7), particularly following the announcement at the 2009 Copenhagen meeting that
developed countries would commit to jointly mobilizing US$100 billion annually by 2020. Further measures to
strengthen the transparency of (ﬁnancial) support have been agreed to as a consequence. Under the UNFCCC’s
Standing Committee on Finance, a biennial process now speciﬁcally reviews ﬂows of climate ﬁnance (UNFCCC
2011a). Moreover, developed countries need to provide information on the provision of ﬁnancial, technological, and
capacity-building support as part of their BRs (UNFCCC 2011a). The Paris Agreement continues this trend by
establishing a transparency framework for support as well as action. However, in another reﬂection of accountability
conﬂicts, the emphasis in practice remains on transparency of action, in particular, mitigation-related transparency
(e.g. as yet there is no agreed system to report on climate ﬁnance; see Roberts & Weikmans 2017).
So far, our discussion has highlighted standards of performance that the transparency framework seeks to make
visible. It is equally important to note here, however, the broader political contestations over accountability that are
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evident in what climate transparency arrangements do not seek to make visible. First, they do not seek to provide
information on parties’ individual ambition levels. Although the decision accompanying the Paris Agreement offers
basic guidance on the information that needs to accompany parties’ ambitions (i.e. as reﬂected in their NDCs), this
guidance is couched in hortatory language (see UNFCCC 2015, para. 27), and is not linked to the enhanced
transparency framework. Likewise, the transparency arrangements reveal little about collective ambition. Although
the new ﬁve-yearly global stocktake included in the Paris Agreement will “assess the collective progress towards
achieving the purpose of this Agreement and its long-term goals” (Article 14.1), it remains unclear how the enhanced
transparency framework will feed into this process.
Second, the transparency arrangements do not seek to uncover information about the (perceived) fairness of
parties’ efforts. Neither the transparency arrangements in the Kyoto Protocol nor in the Cancún Agreements focus
on whether the targets (or pledges) that parties have taken on can be considered to be fair. While the Paris Agreement
does not change this status quo, it is interesting to note that parties are invited to specify why they think their respective
NDCs are fair (and many parties have indeed indicated this in the run-up to Paris, although in quite general terms)5.
While this shows that discussion on the (perceived) fairness of parties’ efforts is not beyond the realm of the feasible in
the international climate regime, the transparency arrangements themselves eschew shedding light on these issues.
In essence, then, the aspects of substantive climate performance that the transparency framework makes visible
relate primarily to monitoring and data generation regarding current national emissions, and (progress in) implementing
contributions/commitments, but not how these are related to ambition or fairness of individual efforts. Despite the
transformative potential often associated with transparency rhetorically, such an extended scope for transparency is
clearly precluded in this contested political context, given that countries are not willing to even negotiate over, much
less extend state-to-state accountability, to such aspects. Because ambition or fairness are not standards that parties
are (willing to be) held to account for, transparency arrangements are thus also not called upon to assist in such a holding
to account, with implications for its transformative potential.
In conclusion, it is worth noting that, in addition to the substantive standards of performance discussed above, there
are a number of procedural standards against which countries are judged in the context of UNFCCC transparency
arrangements. These relate to the nature and quality of the reporting about climate actions (such as emissions trends
and implementation) that the transparency framework seeks to make visible. These procedural standards are also the
ones used by the ERTs in their review of reports, and include: transparency (understood here to mean that information
is presented in a way that is clear and understandable, for instance, by explaining underlying methodologies and
assumptions); consistency (i.e. information is in line with the format or other requirements for submission, and
consistent with information reported earlier and elsewhere); comparability (i.e. information is comparable to that
provided by other parties, for instance, because the same indicators are used); completeness (i.e. information provided
is complete); accuracy (i.e. emission estimates are relatively exact); and timeliness (i.e. information is submitted on time).
As we discuss further in the judgment section, assessing performance against even such procedural criteria
pertaining to reporting faces various challenges in practice, with implications for the extent to which transparency
can further answerability in this context.
4.3. Judgments
Following the “who” and “about what” of transparency arrangements discussed above, we turn here to the judgment
phase, and consider how reporting and review processes function in practice.
With regard to reporting, the record of mitigation-related reporting by developed country parties is generally seen
as adequate, albeit with some variation (Ellis & Moarif 2015, p. 22). For developing countries, the challenge of ever
more regular and comprehensive reporting can be discerned from the fact that, by the end of 2016, only 35 developing
countries had submitted their ﬁrst BUR (which were due by the end of 2014).6 Although reporting requirements for
developing countries are less stringent than those for developed countries, particularly in the pre-Paris era, this record
suggests that developing countries are experiencing difﬁculties with aspects of reporting. This may be related, among
others, to lack of ﬁnancial resources, data, or established domestic reporting infrastructures (Ellis & Moarif 2015, p. 24).
Thus, reporting challenges may be associated in many instances with capacity constraints.
This framing is underlined by the Paris Agreement, which has put into place a new Capacity Building Initiative for
Transparency (UNFCCC 2015, para. 94). Given that Annex I countries’ capacities to report on emissions trends and
implementation are far enough advanced, the focus of transparency-related activities and debates within the UNFCCC
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is now increasingly shifting to developing country transparency and on the means to enhance this, including through
capacity building.
It is unclear, however, what the implications of such ever expanding infrastructures of transparency in developing
countries might be for securing greater accountability of collective climate action through the Paris Agreement’s
enhanced transparency framework. Although capacity constraints in developing countries are real and pressing,
reporting shortfalls may be related to factors other than capacity, such as an unwillingness of a party to subject itself
to international reporting at predetermined intervals. China, for example, only submitted its BUR in January 2017,more
than two years after the deadline. The experiences to date within non-Annex I parties in generating BURs, and their
political willingness to do so, have not sufﬁciently been analyzed, suggesting a key gap in the knowledge required to
assess the transformative potential of transparency in the context of climate action.
As noted earlier, the growing focus on developing country capacities to report at ever more comprehensive levels
also raises the question whether the very act of generating and sharing information (being transparent) also generates
obligations for actions. This is, arguably, where the transformative power of transparency lies, insofar as reporting
and review may facilitate taking additional actions, rather than merely reporting on existing ones. The implications
of such effects are likely to remain the subject of contentious negotiation in this multilateral context, even as their
beneﬁcial aspects may also become more apparent. For example, the transparency framework under the Paris
Agreement may provide new opportunities for collaboration and support in devising additional actions, particularly
for developing countries establishing such processes of information generation and reporting for the ﬁrst time. It might
also generate information that developing countries, called upon to report for the ﬁrst time, can put to use fruitfully in
their domestic contexts in devising their own climate action priorities, regardless of the impact of such information on
furthering accountability within the UNFCCC. With these processes only now getting underway, how they will work
and to whose beneﬁt remain important issues to analyze further.
Moving from experiences with reporting to those pertaining to review (as the second element of the judgment
phase), preliminary assessment suggests that UNFCCC international review processes tend to eschew making
judgments about whether (substantive or even procedural) standards of performance are being met, regardless of
whether they are carried out by technical experts or involve a state-to-state multilateral assessment process. Instead,
they have largely functioned in a manner that avoids individual “naming and shaming,” or for that matter, even
aggregate political judgment about either reporting content or quality.
With regard to the ﬁrst step in the review process, the in-depth expert reviews of national communications
mandated under the UNFCCC (for both developed and developing countries), these are not intended to include
political assessments of the measures adopted (Yamin & Depledge 2004, p. 340), with expert reviewers instructed to
refrain from political judgments. Furthermore, their political consideration within the UNFCCC context is also
minimal. The outcomes of these technical reviews are forwarded to the SBI for consideration, yet there is no follow-
up required from the party in question and little debate about their content within the SBI.
Under the Kyoto Protocol’s transparency arrangements, the stakes were raised, as the outcome of an ERT review
could lead to “questions of implementation,” which could subsequently lead to a state being brought before the
Protocol’s Compliance Committee. As such, although experts are usually required to function in their personal
capacity, the technical expert reviews were a de facto site for political negotiation. While the ERTs are ostensibly
independent, they are often the same government ofﬁcials involved in their own country’s reporting. Even as the ERTs
involved in the reviews of Kyoto Protocol reports have increasingly become part of a (political) dialogue with parties
amounting to compliance facilitation (Huggins 2015), they also “have an interest not to come down too hard on [other
countries] or expose them during the review of the national communication or inventory, for this could lead to similar
treatment of their own country’s reports” (Zahar 2015, p. 75).
The above notwithstanding, country reports and reviews can provide valuable information to other parties and
observers (Yamin & Depledge 2004), which can facilitate the holding to account of states. Moreover, in some cases,
ERTs also carry out a substantive assessment of a party’s progress. For instance, in its review of Canada’s ﬁfth national
communication in 2012, the ERT “noted with strong concern that on the basis of the information provided … and
during the review, Canada could potentially become non-compliant with its commitments under Article 3, paragraph
1, of the Kyoto Protocol [i.e. its Kyoto target]” (UNFCCC 2011c, para. 83). While the ERT thus ﬂagged potential
non-compliance, the actual engagement with the party had to be left to the Protocol’s Compliance Committee –which
ultimately failed to take it up (Zahar 2015, p. 79).
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evident in what climate transparency arrangements do not seek to make visible. First, they do not seek to provide
information on parties’ individual ambition levels. Although the decision accompanying the Paris Agreement offers
basic guidance on the information that needs to accompany parties’ ambitions (i.e. as reﬂected in their NDCs), this
guidance is couched in hortatory language (see UNFCCC 2015, para. 27), and is not linked to the enhanced
transparency framework. Likewise, the transparency arrangements reveal little about collective ambition. Although
the new ﬁve-yearly global stocktake included in the Paris Agreement will “assess the collective progress towards
achieving the purpose of this Agreement and its long-term goals” (Article 14.1), it remains unclear how the enhanced
transparency framework will feed into this process.
Second, the transparency arrangements do not seek to uncover information about the (perceived) fairness of
parties’ efforts. Neither the transparency arrangements in the Kyoto Protocol nor in the Cancún Agreements focus
on whether the targets (or pledges) that parties have taken on can be considered to be fair. While the Paris Agreement
does not change this status quo, it is interesting to note that parties are invited to specify why they think their respective
NDCs are fair (and many parties have indeed indicated this in the run-up to Paris, although in quite general terms)5.
While this shows that discussion on the (perceived) fairness of parties’ efforts is not beyond the realm of the feasible in
the international climate regime, the transparency arrangements themselves eschew shedding light on these issues.
In essence, then, the aspects of substantive climate performance that the transparency framework makes visible
relate primarily to monitoring and data generation regarding current national emissions, and (progress in) implementing
contributions/commitments, but not how these are related to ambition or fairness of individual efforts. Despite the
transformative potential often associated with transparency rhetorically, such an extended scope for transparency is
clearly precluded in this contested political context, given that countries are not willing to even negotiate over, much
less extend state-to-state accountability, to such aspects. Because ambition or fairness are not standards that parties
are (willing to be) held to account for, transparency arrangements are thus also not called upon to assist in such a holding
to account, with implications for its transformative potential.
In conclusion, it is worth noting that, in addition to the substantive standards of performance discussed above, there
are a number of procedural standards against which countries are judged in the context of UNFCCC transparency
arrangements. These relate to the nature and quality of the reporting about climate actions (such as emissions trends
and implementation) that the transparency framework seeks to make visible. These procedural standards are also the
ones used by the ERTs in their review of reports, and include: transparency (understood here to mean that information
is presented in a way that is clear and understandable, for instance, by explaining underlying methodologies and
assumptions); consistency (i.e. information is in line with the format or other requirements for submission, and
consistent with information reported earlier and elsewhere); comparability (i.e. information is comparable to that
provided by other parties, for instance, because the same indicators are used); completeness (i.e. information provided
is complete); accuracy (i.e. emission estimates are relatively exact); and timeliness (i.e. information is submitted on time).
As we discuss further in the judgment section, assessing performance against even such procedural criteria
pertaining to reporting faces various challenges in practice, with implications for the extent to which transparency
can further answerability in this context.
4.3. Judgments
Following the “who” and “about what” of transparency arrangements discussed above, we turn here to the judgment
phase, and consider how reporting and review processes function in practice.
With regard to reporting, the record of mitigation-related reporting by developed country parties is generally seen
as adequate, albeit with some variation (Ellis & Moarif 2015, p. 22). For developing countries, the challenge of ever
more regular and comprehensive reporting can be discerned from the fact that, by the end of 2016, only 35 developing
countries had submitted their ﬁrst BUR (which were due by the end of 2014).6 Although reporting requirements for
developing countries are less stringent than those for developed countries, particularly in the pre-Paris era, this record
suggests that developing countries are experiencing difﬁculties with aspects of reporting. This may be related, among
others, to lack of ﬁnancial resources, data, or established domestic reporting infrastructures (Ellis & Moarif 2015, p. 24).
Thus, reporting challenges may be associated in many instances with capacity constraints.
This framing is underlined by the Paris Agreement, which has put into place a new Capacity Building Initiative for
Transparency (UNFCCC 2015, para. 94). Given that Annex I countries’ capacities to report on emissions trends and
implementation are far enough advanced, the focus of transparency-related activities and debates within the UNFCCC
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is now increasingly shifting to developing country transparency and on the means to enhance this, including through
capacity building.
It is unclear, however, what the implications of such ever expanding infrastructures of transparency in developing
countries might be for securing greater accountability of collective climate action through the Paris Agreement’s
enhanced transparency framework. Although capacity constraints in developing countries are real and pressing,
reporting shortfalls may be related to factors other than capacity, such as an unwillingness of a party to subject itself
to international reporting at predetermined intervals. China, for example, only submitted its BUR in January 2017,more
than two years after the deadline. The experiences to date within non-Annex I parties in generating BURs, and their
political willingness to do so, have not sufﬁciently been analyzed, suggesting a key gap in the knowledge required to
assess the transformative potential of transparency in the context of climate action.
As noted earlier, the growing focus on developing country capacities to report at ever more comprehensive levels
also raises the question whether the very act of generating and sharing information (being transparent) also generates
obligations for actions. This is, arguably, where the transformative power of transparency lies, insofar as reporting
and review may facilitate taking additional actions, rather than merely reporting on existing ones. The implications
of such effects are likely to remain the subject of contentious negotiation in this multilateral context, even as their
beneﬁcial aspects may also become more apparent. For example, the transparency framework under the Paris
Agreement may provide new opportunities for collaboration and support in devising additional actions, particularly
for developing countries establishing such processes of information generation and reporting for the ﬁrst time. It might
also generate information that developing countries, called upon to report for the ﬁrst time, can put to use fruitfully in
their domestic contexts in devising their own climate action priorities, regardless of the impact of such information on
furthering accountability within the UNFCCC. With these processes only now getting underway, how they will work
and to whose beneﬁt remain important issues to analyze further.
Moving from experiences with reporting to those pertaining to review (as the second element of the judgment
phase), preliminary assessment suggests that UNFCCC international review processes tend to eschew making
judgments about whether (substantive or even procedural) standards of performance are being met, regardless of
whether they are carried out by technical experts or involve a state-to-state multilateral assessment process. Instead,
they have largely functioned in a manner that avoids individual “naming and shaming,” or for that matter, even
aggregate political judgment about either reporting content or quality.
With regard to the ﬁrst step in the review process, the in-depth expert reviews of national communications
mandated under the UNFCCC (for both developed and developing countries), these are not intended to include
political assessments of the measures adopted (Yamin & Depledge 2004, p. 340), with expert reviewers instructed to
refrain from political judgments. Furthermore, their political consideration within the UNFCCC context is also
minimal. The outcomes of these technical reviews are forwarded to the SBI for consideration, yet there is no follow-
up required from the party in question and little debate about their content within the SBI.
Under the Kyoto Protocol’s transparency arrangements, the stakes were raised, as the outcome of an ERT review
could lead to “questions of implementation,” which could subsequently lead to a state being brought before the
Protocol’s Compliance Committee. As such, although experts are usually required to function in their personal
capacity, the technical expert reviews were a de facto site for political negotiation. While the ERTs are ostensibly
independent, they are often the same government ofﬁcials involved in their own country’s reporting. Even as the ERTs
involved in the reviews of Kyoto Protocol reports have increasingly become part of a (political) dialogue with parties
amounting to compliance facilitation (Huggins 2015), they also “have an interest not to come down too hard on [other
countries] or expose them during the review of the national communication or inventory, for this could lead to similar
treatment of their own country’s reports” (Zahar 2015, p. 75).
The above notwithstanding, country reports and reviews can provide valuable information to other parties and
observers (Yamin & Depledge 2004), which can facilitate the holding to account of states. Moreover, in some cases,
ERTs also carry out a substantive assessment of a party’s progress. For instance, in its review of Canada’s ﬁfth national
communication in 2012, the ERT “noted with strong concern that on the basis of the information provided … and
during the review, Canada could potentially become non-compliant with its commitments under Article 3, paragraph
1, of the Kyoto Protocol [i.e. its Kyoto target]” (UNFCCC 2011c, para. 83). While the ERT thus ﬂagged potential
non-compliance, the actual engagement with the party had to be left to the Protocol’s Compliance Committee –which
ultimately failed to take it up (Zahar 2015, p. 79).
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The second stage of review and the ﬁnal step in the judgment phase of current UNFCCC transparency
arrangements is the international party-to-party peer review established under the Cancún agreements: the multilateral
assessment for Annex I parties under IAR, and facilitative sharing of views for non-Annex I parties under ICA. By their
very design, these are intended to be political processes, in which countries are to provide an account of their
performance and be subject to questioning from their peers. They involve, by and large, the same government ofﬁcials
who are part of country delegations simultaneously negotiating in the climate talks.
The multilateral assessments that have taken place to date have included a large number of questions posed by
parties to each other, for instance related to individual parties’ use of market-basedmechanisms and the progress made
in achieving climate pledges (Kong 2015). Although given the recent nature of the multilateral assessment process,
empirical analyses are few and far between, this process has been said to, inter alia: create greater clout at the domestic
level for ministries involved in implementation, contribute to policy exchange and learning, clarify technical challenges
in reporting, and offer space for asking “political” questions (Deprez et al. 2015, p. 12; Briner &Moarif 2016, p. 31). The
facilitative sharing of views offers a similar forum for information exchange with regard to developing country
reporting. However, both processes are hampered by limited participation by states. This reﬂects resource limitations:
for smaller countries, it is not always possible to engage in detail with the lengthy reports and their reviews (Briner &
Moarif 2016, p. 31). Moreover, it remains to be seen whether and how these state-to-state processes produce outcomes
that further answerability, let alone change state behavior.
A striking illustration of how even this peer-to-peer review of performance eschews political judgment was evident
during an SBI discussion of experiences and lessons learned from a multilateral assessment session in Bonn in June
2015. During this discussion, Annex I parties categorically rejected a suggestion advanced, inter alia, by India and
Brazil that the SBI could note that the process had revealed some gaps in Annex I reporting, thereby highlighting its
value for continuous learning and improvement. The language on “gaps in reporting” as one of the lessons learned
proved untenable, however, for the European Union and other Annex I parties.7
Avoiding political judgments is likely to be a characteristic also of the enhanced transparency framework under the
Paris Agreement, which is to “be implemented in a facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive manner, respectful of
national sovereignty” (Article 13.3). This means that reporting and review arrangements, as currently organized or
envisioned, do not arrive at what is needed for furthering accountability: a judgment.
Conclusion: While transparency advances, accountability recedes?
We began our analysis by noting that transparency is widely assumed to be essential for securing greater accountability.
Our exploratory analysis above points to another proposition with regard to this relationship: that transparency is
rather a site mirroring climate accountability conﬂicts.
Our analysis shows that the scope and practices of existing transparency arrangements reﬂect ongoing disputes
around responsibility, differentiation, and burden sharing for climate action, and hence around who is to be held to
account and for what. Instead of transparencymediating conﬂicts (as is a dominant assumption) and thereby facilitating
accountability, our analysis suggests that existing UNFCCC systems of transparency may mirror these disputes in their
scope and design. This is evident in the manner in which contested accountability relations, standards of performance,
and judgments are reﬂected in existing transparency arrangements. With regard to relations, we ﬁnd that the contested
negotiations over differentiation between developed and developing countries that have been a red thread throughout the
development of the climate regime also re-emerge in the question of who should be transparent. In terms of standards,
our analysis reveals that the scope of current transparency arrangements is limited to holding to account countries
for monitoring emissions and for making progress toward implementing existing commitments/contributions.
As has been widely noted, these commitments and contributions are, in and of themselves, currently inadequate to
meet the long-term objectives of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. This notwithstanding, achievement of these
contributions also falls outside the scope of existing UNFCCC accountability (and thus transparency) arrangements (with
the notable exception of the Kyoto Protocol’s compliance mechanism). This is also the case for the Paris Agreement,
which does not include a legally binding obligation for any country to implement, let alone achieve, its NDC (and hence
only calls for transparency regarding progress made toward implementing anNDC). Furthermore, substantive performance
criteria, such as ambition or fairness, are not standards against which countries’ climate actions are being judged in
this multilateral context, and hence transparency arrangements are also not designed to shed light on these aspects.
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With regard to processes relating to reaching judgments, our analysis shows that existing UNFCCC transparency
arrangements are predominantly facilitative (again, with a limited exception in the case of the Kyoto Protocol’s
compliance mechanism), with the Paris Agreement continuing this trend for both developed and developing countries.
We conclude then that there is only limited answerability through transparencywithin the UNFCCC, particularly with
regard to ambition and burden sharing to address climate change. Answerability through transparency is conﬁned, in this
multilateral context, to revealing progress made on implementing existing commitments, with virtually no answerability
for actual achievement of commitments or whether they reﬂect ambition or fairness. Furthermore, there is little clear
political judgment about compliance, much less legal enforceability of any of these aspects at the international level.
In light of the above, our analysis raises the provocative question whether evolving UNFCCC transparency
arrangements might even distract from the search for more far-reaching accountability in this global context. As we
noted earlier, one implication of the shift toward a common transparency system is an ever-growing focus on
developing country transparency within the UNFCCC, as reﬂected, for example, in efforts to build capacity for
transparency. While capacity constraints and needs are real in these countries, the relevant accountability question
becomes whether we are barking up the wrong tree here, in shifting the focus of attention in UNFCCC transparency
actions and debates onto the issue of developing country capacity to report.
This focus on capacity building is aligned, in our view, with a dominant framing of reporting and review as
being largely technical processes, implying that the only hurdle to transparency’s potential to furthering
accountability and enhancing trust is the building up of capacities of developing countries to match those of
developed countries (rather than, e.g. broadening the scope of UNFCCC transparency arrangements to make visible,
and hence hold to account for, more stringent standards such as ambition and fairness of individual efforts,
including those of the largest polluters).
Long-standing national sovereignty constraints clearly militate against such far-reaching state-to-state
accountability in this contested context, and it is worth noting that the word accountability does not appear in the Paris
Agreement. Given enduring and hard-to-cross political fault lines over enhancing state-to-state accountability
regarding ambition and fairness, a technocratic emphasis on capacity building within the Paris Agreement’s
transparency arrangements becomes a default option, one that is aligned with an oft-stated assumption of many policy
analysts and academics alike: that more and better information, generated and consistently reported by all in a process
of continuous improvement, is critical to achievingmore ambitious climate action. Our analysis of transparency politics
in the UNFCCC gives pause to this dominant framing, by showing that the scope, practices and effects of UNFCCC
transparency systems are inextricably tied up with (and mirror) ﬁrst-order conﬂicts over the scope of accountability
and burden sharing in this multilateral context, rather than transcending such conﬂicts.
This and other implications of our exploratory analysis suggest a future research agenda for analyzing accountability
through transparency within multilateral climate politics, but also more generally. One question is whether and how to
operationalize a procedural criterion for transparency systems that could facilitate more far-reaching accountability
(also regarding ambition), namely the requirement to ensure comparability of action. This is the case particularly if,
as Ellis et al. (2011) usefully distinguish, one considers political comparability (comparing efforts) rather than technical
comparability (e.g. whether reports use the same metrics). To date, political comparability has remained out of reach.
The Paris Agreement also includes references to comparability, hence it is a pertinent question whether and how this
will be operationalized within its transparency framework, including how differentiation may be addressed.
Another key question is how UNFCCC transparency arrangements might serve to further ex-ante accountability in
this context of anticipatory governance, given the transformative changes necessary to achieve the Paris Agreement’s
goals. While the global stocktake mandated under the Paris Agreement to be held at ﬁve-yearly intervals from 2023
onwards is intended to play a key role in enhancing (collective) ex-ante accountability, and potentially also collective
ambition, its details are yet to be decided. Furthermore, it is unclear how the outcomes of the enhanced transparency
framework will feed into the global stocktake, making this an important issue for further research.
This also brings to the fore another key issue for future analyzes of transparency and accountability in multilateral
climate politics: the informal role of non-state actors and/or domestic accountability mechanisms in enhancing the
formal and partial state-to-state accountability currently operationalized within the UNFCCC. How can non-state
actors bolster accountability in this multilateral context by serving as intermediaries or leveraging information
generated through the formal transparency system (van Asselt 2016)? And how might such efforts feed into the
geopolitics of differentiation or the effort to strengthen collective ambition in this multilateral context?
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The second stage of review and the ﬁnal step in the judgment phase of current UNFCCC transparency
arrangements is the international party-to-party peer review established under the Cancún agreements: the multilateral
assessment for Annex I parties under IAR, and facilitative sharing of views for non-Annex I parties under ICA. By their
very design, these are intended to be political processes, in which countries are to provide an account of their
performance and be subject to questioning from their peers. They involve, by and large, the same government ofﬁcials
who are part of country delegations simultaneously negotiating in the climate talks.
The multilateral assessments that have taken place to date have included a large number of questions posed by
parties to each other, for instance related to individual parties’ use of market-basedmechanisms and the progress made
in achieving climate pledges (Kong 2015). Although given the recent nature of the multilateral assessment process,
empirical analyses are few and far between, this process has been said to, inter alia: create greater clout at the domestic
level for ministries involved in implementation, contribute to policy exchange and learning, clarify technical challenges
in reporting, and offer space for asking “political” questions (Deprez et al. 2015, p. 12; Briner &Moarif 2016, p. 31). The
facilitative sharing of views offers a similar forum for information exchange with regard to developing country
reporting. However, both processes are hampered by limited participation by states. This reﬂects resource limitations:
for smaller countries, it is not always possible to engage in detail with the lengthy reports and their reviews (Briner &
Moarif 2016, p. 31). Moreover, it remains to be seen whether and how these state-to-state processes produce outcomes
that further answerability, let alone change state behavior.
A striking illustration of how even this peer-to-peer review of performance eschews political judgment was evident
during an SBI discussion of experiences and lessons learned from a multilateral assessment session in Bonn in June
2015. During this discussion, Annex I parties categorically rejected a suggestion advanced, inter alia, by India and
Brazil that the SBI could note that the process had revealed some gaps in Annex I reporting, thereby highlighting its
value for continuous learning and improvement. The language on “gaps in reporting” as one of the lessons learned
proved untenable, however, for the European Union and other Annex I parties.7
Avoiding political judgments is likely to be a characteristic also of the enhanced transparency framework under the
Paris Agreement, which is to “be implemented in a facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive manner, respectful of
national sovereignty” (Article 13.3). This means that reporting and review arrangements, as currently organized or
envisioned, do not arrive at what is needed for furthering accountability: a judgment.
Conclusion: While transparency advances, accountability recedes?
We began our analysis by noting that transparency is widely assumed to be essential for securing greater accountability.
Our exploratory analysis above points to another proposition with regard to this relationship: that transparency is
rather a site mirroring climate accountability conﬂicts.
Our analysis shows that the scope and practices of existing transparency arrangements reﬂect ongoing disputes
around responsibility, differentiation, and burden sharing for climate action, and hence around who is to be held to
account and for what. Instead of transparencymediating conﬂicts (as is a dominant assumption) and thereby facilitating
accountability, our analysis suggests that existing UNFCCC systems of transparency may mirror these disputes in their
scope and design. This is evident in the manner in which contested accountability relations, standards of performance,
and judgments are reﬂected in existing transparency arrangements. With regard to relations, we ﬁnd that the contested
negotiations over differentiation between developed and developing countries that have been a red thread throughout the
development of the climate regime also re-emerge in the question of who should be transparent. In terms of standards,
our analysis reveals that the scope of current transparency arrangements is limited to holding to account countries
for monitoring emissions and for making progress toward implementing existing commitments/contributions.
As has been widely noted, these commitments and contributions are, in and of themselves, currently inadequate to
meet the long-term objectives of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. This notwithstanding, achievement of these
contributions also falls outside the scope of existing UNFCCC accountability (and thus transparency) arrangements (with
the notable exception of the Kyoto Protocol’s compliance mechanism). This is also the case for the Paris Agreement,
which does not include a legally binding obligation for any country to implement, let alone achieve, its NDC (and hence
only calls for transparency regarding progress made toward implementing anNDC). Furthermore, substantive performance
criteria, such as ambition or fairness, are not standards against which countries’ climate actions are being judged in
this multilateral context, and hence transparency arrangements are also not designed to shed light on these aspects.
Transparency in climate politics A. Gupta and H. van Asselt
© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd 13
With regard to processes relating to reaching judgments, our analysis shows that existing UNFCCC transparency
arrangements are predominantly facilitative (again, with a limited exception in the case of the Kyoto Protocol’s
compliance mechanism), with the Paris Agreement continuing this trend for both developed and developing countries.
We conclude then that there is only limited answerability through transparencywithin the UNFCCC, particularly with
regard to ambition and burden sharing to address climate change. Answerability through transparency is conﬁned, in this
multilateral context, to revealing progress made on implementing existing commitments, with virtually no answerability
for actual achievement of commitments or whether they reﬂect ambition or fairness. Furthermore, there is little clear
political judgment about compliance, much less legal enforceability of any of these aspects at the international level.
In light of the above, our analysis raises the provocative question whether evolving UNFCCC transparency
arrangements might even distract from the search for more far-reaching accountability in this global context. As we
noted earlier, one implication of the shift toward a common transparency system is an ever-growing focus on
developing country transparency within the UNFCCC, as reﬂected, for example, in efforts to build capacity for
transparency. While capacity constraints and needs are real in these countries, the relevant accountability question
becomes whether we are barking up the wrong tree here, in shifting the focus of attention in UNFCCC transparency
actions and debates onto the issue of developing country capacity to report.
This focus on capacity building is aligned, in our view, with a dominant framing of reporting and review as
being largely technical processes, implying that the only hurdle to transparency’s potential to furthering
accountability and enhancing trust is the building up of capacities of developing countries to match those of
developed countries (rather than, e.g. broadening the scope of UNFCCC transparency arrangements to make visible,
and hence hold to account for, more stringent standards such as ambition and fairness of individual efforts,
including those of the largest polluters).
Long-standing national sovereignty constraints clearly militate against such far-reaching state-to-state
accountability in this contested context, and it is worth noting that the word accountability does not appear in the Paris
Agreement. Given enduring and hard-to-cross political fault lines over enhancing state-to-state accountability
regarding ambition and fairness, a technocratic emphasis on capacity building within the Paris Agreement’s
transparency arrangements becomes a default option, one that is aligned with an oft-stated assumption of many policy
analysts and academics alike: that more and better information, generated and consistently reported by all in a process
of continuous improvement, is critical to achievingmore ambitious climate action. Our analysis of transparency politics
in the UNFCCC gives pause to this dominant framing, by showing that the scope, practices and effects of UNFCCC
transparency systems are inextricably tied up with (and mirror) ﬁrst-order conﬂicts over the scope of accountability
and burden sharing in this multilateral context, rather than transcending such conﬂicts.
This and other implications of our exploratory analysis suggest a future research agenda for analyzing accountability
through transparency within multilateral climate politics, but also more generally. One question is whether and how to
operationalize a procedural criterion for transparency systems that could facilitate more far-reaching accountability
(also regarding ambition), namely the requirement to ensure comparability of action. This is the case particularly if,
as Ellis et al. (2011) usefully distinguish, one considers political comparability (comparing efforts) rather than technical
comparability (e.g. whether reports use the same metrics). To date, political comparability has remained out of reach.
The Paris Agreement also includes references to comparability, hence it is a pertinent question whether and how this
will be operationalized within its transparency framework, including how differentiation may be addressed.
Another key question is how UNFCCC transparency arrangements might serve to further ex-ante accountability in
this context of anticipatory governance, given the transformative changes necessary to achieve the Paris Agreement’s
goals. While the global stocktake mandated under the Paris Agreement to be held at ﬁve-yearly intervals from 2023
onwards is intended to play a key role in enhancing (collective) ex-ante accountability, and potentially also collective
ambition, its details are yet to be decided. Furthermore, it is unclear how the outcomes of the enhanced transparency
framework will feed into the global stocktake, making this an important issue for further research.
This also brings to the fore another key issue for future analyzes of transparency and accountability in multilateral
climate politics: the informal role of non-state actors and/or domestic accountability mechanisms in enhancing the
formal and partial state-to-state accountability currently operationalized within the UNFCCC. How can non-state
actors bolster accountability in this multilateral context by serving as intermediaries or leveraging information
generated through the formal transparency system (van Asselt 2016)? And how might such efforts feed into the
geopolitics of differentiation or the effort to strengthen collective ambition in this multilateral context?
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In conclusion, and even as many gaps in understanding remain, our exploratory analysis suggests that widely
assumed links between enhanced transparency and greater accountability do not always materialize. Instead, we show
how transparency is a site wherein long-standing, contested aspects of collective action on climate change are being
negotiated, reinterpreted, and operationalized. As such, systematic and context-speciﬁc analyzes of the transparency–
accountability relationship remain important and timely.
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Notes
1 UNFCCC sessions attended include Warsaw 2013, Bonn 2014, Geneva 2015, Bonn 2015 (June and October), Paris 2015, Bonn
2016 (May), and Marrakesh 2016.
2 http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_natcom/submitted_natcom/items/7742.php.
3 See http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/true-up_process/items/9023.php.
4 http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_parties/ica/facilitative_sharing_of_views/items/9382.php.
5 See, for example, the contributions by Australia, China, the European Union, India, and the United States at: http://unfccc.int/
focus/indc_portal/items/8766.php.
6 http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_natcom/reporting_on_climate_change/items/8722.php.
7 SBI 42, held in Bonn, June 2015. Observation of an SBI discussion on the lessons learned from the multilateral assessment process
undertaken on June 4 and 5.
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In conclusion, and even as many gaps in understanding remain, our exploratory analysis suggests that widely
assumed links between enhanced transparency and greater accountability do not always materialize. Instead, we show
how transparency is a site wherein long-standing, contested aspects of collective action on climate change are being
negotiated, reinterpreted, and operationalized. As such, systematic and context-speciﬁc analyzes of the transparency–
accountability relationship remain important and timely.
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Notes
1 UNFCCC sessions attended include Warsaw 2013, Bonn 2014, Geneva 2015, Bonn 2015 (June and October), Paris 2015, Bonn
2016 (May), and Marrakesh 2016.
2 http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_natcom/submitted_natcom/items/7742.php.
3 See http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/true-up_process/items/9023.php.
4 http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_parties/ica/facilitative_sharing_of_views/items/9382.php.
5 See, for example, the contributions by Australia, China, the European Union, India, and the United States at: http://unfccc.int/
focus/indc_portal/items/8766.php.
6 http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_natcom/reporting_on_climate_change/items/8722.php.
7 SBI 42, held in Bonn, June 2015. Observation of an SBI discussion on the lessons learned from the multilateral assessment process
undertaken on June 4 and 5.
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